Equilibrium Returns with Transaction Costs by Bouchard, Bruno et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
08
46
4v
4 
 [q
-fi
n.P
M
]  
5 A
pr
 20
18
Equilibrium Returns with Transaction Costs∗
Bruno Bouchard† Masaaki Fukasawa‡ Martin Herdegen§
Johannes Muhle-Karbe¶
October 16, 2018
Abstract
We study how trading costs are reflected in equilibrium returns. To this end, we develop
a tractable continuous-time risk-sharing model, where heterogeneous mean-variance investors
trade subject to a quadratic transaction cost. The corresponding equilibrium is characterized
as the unique solution of a system of coupled but linear forward-backward stochastic differential
equations. Explicit solutions are obtained in a number of concrete settings. The sluggishness of
the frictional portfolios makes the corresponding equilibrium returns mean-reverting. Compared
to the frictionless case, expected returns are higher if the more risk-averse agents are net sellers
or if the asset supply expands over time.
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1 Introduction
It is empirically well documented that asset returns depend on liquidity [3, 7, 37]. To understand
the theoretical underpinning of such “liquidity premia”, we study a continuous-time risk-sharing
equilibrium with transaction costs.1 For tractability, we assume (local) mean-variance preferences
and quadratic trading costs, levied on the agents’ trading rates. Then, both the unique equilibrium
return that clears the market and the corresponding optimal trading strategies can be characterized
by a system of coupled but linear forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs).
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1Liquidity premia with exogenous asset prices are studied by [13, 26, 33, 19, 14], for example.
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These equations can be solved explicitly in terms of matrix power series, leading to closed-form
expressions for the liquidity premia compared to the frictionless benchmark.
If the risk aversions of all agents are homogenous and the asset supply remains constant over
time, then the frictionless price dynamics still clear the market. As a consequence, illiquidity only
affects trading strategies but not equilibrium prices in this case. By contrast, if the asset supply
expands over time, positive liquidity premia are necessary to compensate the agents for the trading
costs incurred when purchasing these additional shares.
Nontrivial liquidity premia also arise with heterogenous preferences. Then, the more risk averse
agents have a stronger motive to trade and therefore have to provide additional compensation
to the less risk-averse ones. This leads to positive liquidity premia when the more risk averse
agents are net sellers. With heterogenous preferences, illiquidity also makes expected returns mean
reverting. This result does not depend on mean-reverting fundamentals, but is instead induced by
the sluggishness of the frictional portfolios. With trading costs, allocations do not move directly
to their stationary allocation but only gradually adjust over time, leading to autocorrelated return
dynamics. For example, if endowment exposures have independent increments, then the liquidity
premia have Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics. If the agents exogenous trading needs are also mean-
reverting, they enter the liquidity premium as a stochastic mean-reversion level. Illiquidity in turn
determines the fluctuations of the actual equilibrium return around this value.
From a mathematical perspective, our analysis is based on the study of systems of coupled but
linear FBSDEs. Since their forward components are degenerate, general FBSDE theory as in [15]
only yields local existence in this context. As we need global existence and uniqueness results, we
provide a direct argument. Using the theory of primary matrix functions, we extend the univariate
results of Bank, Soner, and Voß [5] to the multivariate settings needed to analyze the interaction
of multiple agents trading several assets. In order to cover tractable stationary models as a special
case, we also show how to extend this analysis to infinite time horizons under suitable transversality
conditions.
Related Literature Equilibrium models with transaction costs are notoriously intractable, be-
cause trading costs severely complicate the agents’ individual optimization problems. Moreover,
representative agents cannot be used to simplify the analysis since they abstract from the trades
between the individual market participants.
Accordingly, most of the literature on equilibrium asset pricing with transaction costs has
focused either on numerical methods or on models with very particular simplifying assumptions.
For example, [23, 9, 8] propose algorithms for the numerical approximation of equilibrium dynamics
in discrete-time, finite-state models.
In contrast, [32, 45, 47] obtain explicit formulas in continuous-time models but focus on settings
with deterministic asset prices for tractability. Garleanu and Pedersen [18] solve for the equilibrium
returns in a model with a single rational agent and noise traders. For exogenous mean-reverting
demands, they also obtain mean-reverting returns like in our model.2 Our more general results show
that this effect persists even in the absence of mean-reverting fundamentals, as the sluggishness of
optimal portfolios with transaction costs already suffices to generate this effect.
A similar observation is made by Sannikov and Skrzypacz [38]. Like us, they study a model with
several rational mean-variance investors. However, by making information about trading targets
private, they also strive to endogenize the price impact. If trades are implemented by means of a
“conditional double auction”, where each agent observes all others’ supply and demand schedules,
2Mean-reverting fundamentals also drive the mean-reverting dynamics in the overlapping-generations model with
linear costs studied in [44], for example.
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then linear, stationary equilibria can be characterized by a coupled system of algebraic equations.
However, this system generally admits multiple solutions and these are not available in closed form
except in the case of (almost) homogenous risk aversions.
Outline of the paper This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, both
in its frictionless baseline version and with quadratic trading costs. In Section 3, we derive the
frictionless equilibrium, before turning to individual optimality with transaction costs (and given
exogenous returns) in Section 4. Section 5 in turn contains our main results, on existence, unique-
ness, and an explicit characterization of the equilibrium return, complemented by several examples.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the existence and uniqueness results for linear FBSDEs
that are used in Section 4 and 5. Appendix B summarizes some material on primary matrix
functions that is needed in Appendix A.
Notation Throughout, we fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈T , P ), where either T =
[0, T ] for T ∈ (0,∞) (“finite time horizon”) or T = [0,∞) for T = +∞ (“infinite time horizon”).
To treat models with a finite and infinite time horizon in a unified manner, we fix a constant
δ ≥ 0,3 and say that an Rℓ-valued progressively measurable process (Xt)t∈T belongs to L pδ , p ≥ 1,
if E[
∫ T
0 e
−δt‖Xt‖pdt] <∞, where ‖ · ‖ is any norm on Rℓ. Likewise, an Rℓ-valued local martingale
(Mt)t∈T belongs to M
p
δ , p ≥ 1, if E[‖
∫ T
0 e
−2δsd[M ]s‖p/2] < ∞. Here, ‖ · ‖ denotes any matrix
norm on Rℓ×ℓ.
2 Model
2.1 Financial Market
We consider a financial market with 1 + d assets. The first one is safe, and normalized to one for
simplicity. The other d assets are risky, with dynamics driven by d-dimensional Brownian motion
(Wt)t∈T :
dSt = µtdt+ σdWt. (2.1)
Here, the Rd-valued expected return process (µt)t∈T ∈ L 2δ is to be determined in equilibrium,
whereas the constant Rd×d-valued volatility matrix σ is given exogenously. Throughout, we write
Σ = σσ⊤ and assume that this infinitesimal covariance matrix is nonsingular.
Remark 2.1. Since our goal is to obtain a model with maximal tractability, it is natural to assume
that the exogenous volatility matrix σ is constant.4 However, stochastic volatilities are bound to
appear naturally in more general models where they are determined endogenously. Such extensions
of the current setting are an important direction for further research.
3This will be the time-discount rate below; for infinite horizon models, it needs to be strictly positive.
4If one instead assumes that the volatility follows some (sufficiently integrable) stochastic process (σt)t∈T , then
the subsequent characterization of individually optimal strategies and equilibrium returns in terms of coupled but
linear FBSDEs as in (A.1)–(A.2) still applies. However, the stochastic volatility then appears in the coefficients of
this equation, so that the solution can no longer be characterized (semi-)explicitly in terms of matrix power series.
Instead, a “backward stochastic Riccati differential equation” appears as a crucial new ingredient already in the
one-dimensional models with exogenous price dynamics studied by [31, 6].
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2.2 Endowments, Preferences, and Trading Costs
A finite number of agents n = 1, . . . , N receive (cumulative) random endowments (Y nt )t∈T with
dynamics
dY nt = dA
n
t + (ζ
n
t )
⊤σdWt + dM
⊥,n
t , n = 1, . . . , N. (2.2)
Here, the R-valued adapted process (Ant )t∈T with E[
∫ T
0 e
−δsd|A|s] <∞ denotes the finite variation
component of Agent n’s endowment; it may contain lump-sum payments as well as absolutely
continuous cash-flows. The Rd-valued process ζn ∈ L 2δ describes the exposure of the endowment to
asset price shocks. Finally, the orthogonal R-valued martingale M⊥,n ∈ M 2δ/2 models unhedgeable
shocks.
Without trading costs, the goal of Agent n is to choose an Rd-valued progressively measurable
trading strategy ϕ ∈ L 2δ (the number of shares held in each risky asset) to maximize the (dis-
counted) expected changes of her wealth, penalized for the quadratic variation of wealth changes
as in, e.g., [17, 18]:
E
[∫ T
0
e−δt
(
ϕ⊤t dSt + dY
n
t −
γn
2
d
〈∫ ·
0 ϕ
⊤
s dSs + Y
n
〉
t
)]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−δt
(
ϕ⊤t µt −
γn
2
(ϕt + ζ
n
t )
⊤Σ(ϕt + ζnt )
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
e−δt
(
dAnt −
γn
2
d〈M⊥,n〉t
)]
→ max! (2.3)
Here, γn > 0 and δ ≥ 0 are Agent n’s risk aversion and the (common) discount rate, respectively.
We assume without loss of generality that
γN = max(γ1, . . . , γN ),
so that Agent N has the highest risk aversion among all agents. For simplicity, we also suppose
that the initial stock position ϕn0− of each agent is zero.
Remark 2.2. A strictly positive discount rate allows to postpone the planning horizon indefinitely
to obtain stationary infinite-horizon solutions as in [35, 34, 17, 18]. In that case, ϕ ∈ L 2δ is an
appropriate transversality condition that ensures that the problem is well posed.
The solution of the frictionless problem (2.3) is readily determined by pointwise optimization
as
ϕnt =
Σ−1µt
γn
− ζnt . (2.4)
The first term is the classical (myopic) Merton portfolio; the second is the mean-variance hedge for
the replicable part of the endowment.
As in [1, 20, 17, 10, 18, 2, 22, 36, 6, 5] we now assume that trades incur costs proportional to the
square of the order flow ϕ˙t =
d
dtϕt.
5 This trading friction can either be interpreted as temporary
price impact proportional to both trade size and trade speed, or as a (progressive) transaction tax
or trading fee. For the first interpretation it is natural to assume that trades also move the prices
of correlated securities (compare [39, 17, 18, 21]), and each agent’s trades also affect the others’
5The assumption of quadratic rather than proportional costs is made for tractability. However, buoyed by the
results from the partial equilibrium literature, we expect the qualitative properties of our results to be robust across
different small transaction costs, compare with the discussion in [36].
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execution prices. In contrast, a tax as in [43] or the fee charged by an exchange affects trades in each
asset and by each agent separately. We focus on the second specification here, which simplifies the
analysis by avoiding a coupling of the agents’ optimization problems through common price impact.
To wit, λm > 0, m = 1, . . . , d, describes the quadratic costs levied separately on each agent’s order
flow for asset m and we denote by Λ ∈ Rd×d the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries λ1, . . . , λd.6
With this notation, Agent n’s optimization problem then reads as follows:
Jn(ϕ˙) :=E
[∫ T
0
e−δt
(
ϕ⊤t µt −
γn
2
(ϕt + ζ
n
t )
⊤Σ(ϕt + ζnt )− ϕ˙⊤t Λϕ˙tdt
)
dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
e−δt
(
dAnt −
γn
2
d〈Mn⊥〉t
)]
→ max! (2.5)
In order to avoid infinite transaction costs, all trading rates (as well as the corresponding trading
strategies themselves) naturally have to belong to L 2δ .
The goal now is to solve for the equilibrium excess return that matches the agents’ (and,
potentially, noise traders’) supply and demand. A similar model with a single strategic agent
and noise traders with a particular parametric demand is analyzed in [18, Section 4]. Conversely,
[49, 11, 29, 48] study models of the above form without noise traders (and with exponential rather
than mean-variance preferences).
3 Frictionless Equilibrium
For later comparison to the frictional case, we first consider the model without trading costs. To
clear the market, the expected return process (µt)t∈T needs to be chosen so that the demand of the
strategic agents and the exogenous demand of a group of noise traders matches the total supply of
zero at all times. To wit, modeling the noise trader demand by an exogenous process ψ ∈ L 2δ with
ψ0− = 0, the clearing condition reads as
0 = ϕ1t + . . .+ ϕ
N
t + ψt.
(Alternatively, one can interpret −ψ as the exogenous supply of the risky assets.) In view of (2.4),
the frictionless equilibrium expected return therefore is
µt =
Σ(ζ1t + ζ
2
t + . . .+ ζ
N
t − ψt)
1/γ1 + 1/γ2 + . . .+ 1/γN
. (3.1)
The interpretation is that the investment demand induced by the equilibrium return needs to offset
the difference between the noise trading volume and the strategic agents’ total hedging demand.
Whence, the equilibrium return scales with the (exogenous) covariance matrix of the risky assets,
relative to the total risk tolerance.
In this simple model, equilibrium dynamics and strategies are known in closed form, rather than
only being characterized via martingale representation [28] or BSDEs [29]. This makes the model
an ideal point of departure for analyzing the impact of transaction costs on the equilibrium return.
6More general specifications do no seem natural for the tax interpretation of the model. Note, however, that the
mathematical analysis below only uses that Λ is symmetric and positive definite.
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4 Individual Optimality with Transaction Costs
As a first step towards our general equilibrium analysis in Section 5, we now consider each Agent
n’s individual optimization problem with transaction costs (2.5), taking an expected return process
µ ∈ L 2δ as exogenously given. A multidimensional generalization of the calculus of variations
argument of [5] leads to the following representation of the optimal strategy in terms of a coupled
but linear system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (henceforth FBSDEs):
Lemma 4.1. Let ϕnt =
Σ−1µt
γn − ζnt be the frictionless optimizer from (2.4). Then the frictional
optimization problem (2.5) for Agent n has a unique solution, characterized by the following FBSDE:
dϕΛ,nt = ϕ˙
Λ,n
t dt, ϕ
Λ,n
0 = 0,
dϕ˙Λ,nt = dM
n
t +
γnΛ−1Σ
2
(ϕΛ,nt − ϕnt )dt+ δϕ˙Λ,nt dt.
(4.1)
Here, ϕΛ,nt , ϕ˙
Λ,n
t ∈ L 2δ , and the Rd-valued square-integrable martingale Mn needs to be determined
as part of the solution. If T <∞, the dynamics (4.1) are complemented by the terminal condition7
ϕ˙Λ,nT = 0. (4.2)
For T = ∞, Agent n’s unique individually optimal strategy ϕΛ,n has the explicit representation
(A.8); the corresponding optimal trading rate ϕ˙Λ,n is given in feedback form by (A.17). For T <∞,
the corresponding formulas are provided in (A.21) and (A.29), respectively.
Proof. Since the goal functional (2.5) is strictly convex, (2.5) has a unique solution if and only if
there exists a (unique) solution to the following first-order condition [16]:〈
J ′ (ϕ˙) , ϑ˙
〉
= 0, for all ϑ with ϑ0 = 0 and ϑ, ϑ˙ ∈ L 2δ . (4.3)
Here, the Gaˆteaux derivative of J in the direction ϑ˙ is given by
〈
J ′ (ϕ˙) , ϑ˙
〉
= lim
ρ→0
J(ϕ˙+ ρϑ˙)− J(ϕ˙)
ρ
= E
[∫ T
0
e−δt
(
(µ⊤t − γn(ϕt + ζnt )⊤Σ)
(∫ t
0
ϑ˙sds
)
− 2 (ϕ˙t)⊤ Λϑ˙t
)
dt
]
.
By Fubini’s theorem, ∫ T
0
(
e−δt(µ⊤t − γn (ϕt + ζnt )⊤Σ)
(∫ t
0
ϑ˙sds
))
dt
=
∫ T
0
(∫ T
s
e−δt
(
µ⊤t − γn (ϕt + ζnt )⊤Σ
)
dt
)
ϑ˙sds.
Together with the tower property of the conditional expectation, this allows to rewrite the first-
order condition (4.3) as
0 = E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−δs
(
µ⊤s − γn (ϕs + ζns )⊤Σ
)
ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
− 2e−δt (ϕ˙)⊤ Λ
)
ϑ˙tdt
]
.
7This means that agents stop trading near maturity, when there is not enough time left to recuperate the costs
of further transactions. If T = ∞, this terminal condition is replaced by the transversality conditions implicit in
ϕΛ,nt , ϕ˙
Λ,n
t ∈ L 2δ for δ > 0.
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Since this has to hold for any perturbation ϑ˙, (2.5) has a (unique) solution ϕ˙Λ,n if and only if
ϕ˙Λ,nt =
γnΛ−1Σ
2
eδtE
[∫ T
t
e−δs
(
Σ−1µs
γn
− ζns − ϕΛ,ns
)
ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
(4.4)
has a a (unique) solution.
Now, assume that (4.4) has a (unique) solution ϕ˙Λ,n. Note that if T <∞, (4.2) is satisfied. De-
fine the square-integrable martingale M˜t =
γnΛ−1Σ
2 E
[ ∫ T
0 e
−δs(ϕns −ϕΛ,ns )ds|Ft
]
, t ∈ T . Integration
by parts then allows to rewrite (4.4) as
dϕ˙Λ,nt = e
δtdM˜t − γ
nΛ−1Σ
2
(ϕnt − ϕΛ,nt )dt+ δϕ˙Λ,nt dt.
Together with the definition dϕΛ,nt = ϕ˙
Λ,n
t dt, this yields the claimed FBSDE representation (4.1).
Conversely, assume that (4.1) has a (unique) solution (ϕΛ,n, ϕ˙Λ,n,Mn), where ϕΛ,n, ϕ˙Λ,n ∈ L 2δ
and Mn is an Rℓ-valued martingale with finite second moments.
First note that, for t ∈ T with t <∞, integration by parts gives
e−δtϕ˙Λ,nt = ϕ˙
Λ,n
0 +
∫ t
0
e−δsdMns +
∫ t
0
e−δs
γnΛ−1Σ
2
(ϕΛ,ns − ϕnt )ds. (4.5)
Next, we claim that
ϕ˙Λ,n0 = −
∫ T
0
e−δsdMns −
∫ T
0
e−δs
γnΛ−1Σ
2
(ϕΛ,ns − ϕnt )ds. (4.6)
If T <∞, this follows from (4.5) for t = T together with the terminal condition (4.2). If T =∞, we
argue as follows: since ϕ˙Λ,n ∈ L 2δ , there exists an increasing sequence (tk)k∈N with limk→∞ tk =∞
along which the left-hand side of (4.5) converges a.s. to zero. Moreover, Proposition A.1, the
martingale convergence theorem and ϕΛ,n, ϕn ∈ L 2δ show that the right-hand side of (4.5) converges
(along tk) a.s. to
ϕ˙Λ,n0 +
∫ ∞
0
e−δsdMns +
∫ ∞
0
e−δs
γnΛ−1Σ
2
(ϕΛ,ns − ϕnt )ds.
Hence, (4.6) holds also in this case.
Inserting (4.6) into (4.5), taking conditional expectations and rearranging in turn yields (4.4).
It remains to show that the FBSDE (4.1) has a (unique) solution (ϕΛ,n, ϕ˙Λ,n,Mn). Since
the matrix γ
n
2 Λ
−1Σ has only positive eigenvalues (because it is the product of two symmetric
positive definite matrices, cf. [40, Proposition 6.1]), this follows from Theorem A.2 (for T =∞) or
Theorem A.4 (for T <∞), respectively.
5 Equilibrium with Transaction Costs
5.1 Equilibrium Returns
We now use the above characterization of individually optimal strategies to determine the equilib-
rium return (µt)t∈T , for which the agents’ individually optimal demands match the zero net supply
of the risky asset at all times. As each agent’s trading rate is now constrained to be absolutely
continuous, the same needs to hold for the exogenous noise-trading volume:
dψt = ψ˙tdt,
7
where dψ˙t = µ
ψ
t dt+dM
ψ
t for µ
ψ ∈ L 2δ and a local martingaleMψ. We also assume that ψ, ψ˙ ∈ L 2δ .
The key ingredient for the equilibrium return is the solution of another system of coupled but linear
FBSDEs:
Lemma 5.1. There exists a unique solution (ϕΛ, ϕ˙Λ) = (ϕΛ,1, . . . , ϕΛ,N−1, ϕ˙Λ,1, . . . , ϕ˙Λ,N−1) of the
following FBSDE:
dϕΛt = ϕ˙
Λ
t dt, ϕ0 = 0,
dϕ˙Λt = dMt +
(
BϕΛt + δϕ˙
Λ
t −Aζt + χt
)
dt,
(5.1)
satisfying the terminal condition ϕ˙ΛT = 0 if T <∞. Here, M is an Rd(N−1)-valued martingale with
finite second moments, ζ = ((ζ1)⊤, . . . , (ζN )⊤)⊤,
B =


(
γN−γ1
N + γ
1
)
Λ−1Σ
2 · · · γ
N−γN−1
N
Λ−1Σ
2
...
. . .
...
γN−γ1
N
Λ−1Σ
2 · · ·
(
γN−γN−1
N + γ
N−1
)
Λ−1Σ
2

 ∈ Rd(N−1)×d(N−1),
A =


(
γ1
N − γ1
)
Λ−1Σ
2 · · · γ
N−1
N
Λ−1Σ
2
γN
N
Λ−1Σ
2
...
. . .
...
...
γ1
N
Λ−1Σ
2 · · ·
(
γN−1
N − γN−1
)
Λ−1Σ
2
γN
N
Λ−1Σ
2

 ∈ Rd(N−1)×dN ,
and
χt =
1
N
((
γNΛ−1Σ
2
ψt + δψ˙t − µψt
)⊤
, . . . ,
(
γNΛ−1Σ
2
ψt + δψ˙t − µψt
)⊤)⊤
∈ Rd(N−1).
Proof. Lemma A.5 shows that all eigenvalues of the matrix B are real and positive; in particular,
B is invertible. The assertion in turn follows from Theorem A.2 for T =∞ and from Theorem A.4
for T <∞ because ζ, χ ∈ L 2δ .
We can now state our main result:
Theorem 5.2. The unique frictional equilibrium return is
µΛt =
N−1∑
n=1
(γn − γN )Σ
N
ϕΛ,nt +
N∑
n=1
γnΣ
N
ζnt −
γNΣ
N
ψt +
2Λ
N
(µψt − δψ˙t). (5.2)
The corresponding individually optimal trading strategies of Agents n = 1, . . . , N are ϕΛ,1, . . . , ϕΛ,N−1
from Lemma 5.1 and ϕΛ,N = −∑N−1n=1 ϕΛ,n − ψ.
Proof. Let ν ∈ L 2δ be any equilibrium return and denote by ϑΛ = (ϑΛ,1, . . . , ϑΛ,N ) the corre-
sponding individually optimal trading strategies. Then, market clearing implies that not only the
positions of the agents but also their trading rates must sum to zero, 0 =
∑N
n=1 ϑ˙
Λ,n+ ψ˙. Together
with the FBSDEs (4.1) describing each agent’s optimal trading rate, it follows that
0 = dMt +
N∑
n=1
Λ−1
2
(
γnΣϑΛ,nt − (νt − γnΣζnt )
)
dt+
N∑
n=1
δϑ˙Λ,nt dt+ dψ˙t,
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for a local martingale M . Market clearing implies ϑΛ,N = −∑N−1n=1 ϑΛ,n − ψ, and so this gives
0 = dMt +
Λ−1
2
(
N−1∑
n=1
(γn − γN )ΣϑΛ,nt −
N∑
n=1
(νt − γnΣζnt )− γNΣψt
)
dt− δψ˙tdt+ µψt dt+ dMψt .
Since any continuous local martingale of finite variation is constant, it follows that
νt =
N−1∑
n=1
(γn − γN )Σ
N
ϑΛ,nt +
N∑
n=1
γnΣ
N
ζnt −
γNΣ
N
ψt +
2Λ
N
(µψt − δψ˙t). (5.3)
Plugging this expression for νt back into Agent n = 1, . . . , N − 1’s individual optimality condi-
tion (4.1), we deduce that
dϑ˙Λ,nt = dM
n
t +
Λ−1Σ
2
(
γnϑΛ,nt +
N−1∑
m=1
γN − γm
N
ϑΛ,mt + γ
nζnt −
N∑
m=1
γm
N
ζmt
)
dt
+
1
N
(
γNΛ
−1Σ
2
ψt + δψ˙t − µψt
)
dt, n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Hence, (ϑΛ,1, . . . , ϑΛ,N−1, ϑ˙Λ,1, . . . , ϑ˙Λ,N−1) solves the FBSDE (5.1) and therefore coincides with its
unique solution from Lemma 5.1. Market clearing in turn shows ϑΛ,N = ϕΛ,N , and (5.3) implies
that the equilibrium return coincides with (5.2). This establishes that if an equilibrium exists, then
it has to be of the proposed form.
To verify that the proposed returns process and trading strategies indeed form an equilibrium,
we revert the above arguments. Market clearing holds by definition of ϕΛ,N , so it remains to check
that ϕΛ,n is indeed optimal for agent n = 1, . . . , N . To this end, it suffices to show that the
individual optimality conditions (4.4) are satisfied for n = 1, . . . , N . After inserting the definitions
of µΛ, one first realises that for n = 1, . . . , N − 1, (4.4) coincides with the respective equation in
(5.1), and for n = N , this follows from market clearing. This completes the proof.
5.2 Equilibrium Liquidity Premia
Let us now discuss the equilibrium liquidity premia implied by Theorem 5.2, i.e., the differences
between the frictional equilibrium returns (5.2) and their frictionless counterparts (3.1). To this end,
denote by ϕ¯n, n = 1, . . . , N , the frictionless optimal strategy from (2.4) for Agent n, corresponding
to the frictionless equilibrium return (3.1):
ϕ¯nt =
1/γn
(∑N
m=1 ζ
m
t − ψt
)
∑N
m=1 1/γ
m
− ζnt .
With this notation, the frictionless equilibrium return µ can be written as
µt =
N∑
n=1
γnΣ
N
(ϕ¯nt + ζ
n
t ). (5.4)
Now subtract (5.4) from the frictional equilibrium return (5.2), use that −∑N−1n=1 ϕΛ,n = ϕΛN +ψt
by the frictional clearing condition, and note that
∑N
n=1(ϕ
Λ,n
t − ϕ¯nt ) = (−ψt+ψt) = 0 by frictional
9
and frictionless market clearing. This yields the following expression for the liquidity premium:
LiPrt := µ
Λ
t − µt =
N∑
n=1
γnΣ
N
ϕΛ,nt +
N∑
n=1
γnΣ
N
ζnt +
2Λ
N
(µψt − δψ˙t)−
N∑
n=1
γnΣ
N
(ϕ¯nt + ζt)
=
Σ
N
N∑
n=1
γn(ϕΛ,nt − ϕ¯nt ) +
2Λ
N
(µψt − δψ˙t)
=
Σ
N
N∑
n=1
(γn − γ¯)(ϕΛ,nt − ϕ¯nt ) +
2Λ
N
(µψt − δψ˙t), (5.5)
where γ¯ =
∑N
n=1
γn
N denotes the average risk aversion of the strategic agents.
Let us now interpret this result. A first observation is that if all agents are strategic and have
the same risk aversion, then the frictionless equilibrium returns (3.1) also clear the market with
transaction costs:
Corollary 5.3. Suppose there are no noise traders and all strategic agents have the same risk
aversion γ¯ = γ1 = . . . = γN . Then there are no liquidity premia.
A similar result has been established for exponential investors in the limit for small transaction
costs by [24]. In the present quadratic context, this result holds true exactly. A result in the same
spirit in a static model is [4, Corollary 4.12], where incompleteness also only affects strategies but
not equilibrium prices for mean-variance investors with homogenous risk aversions. Another related
result is [38, Proposition 12], where homogeneous risk aversion imply that the frictional equilibrium
converges to the frictionless one as the horizon grows.
However, this result no longer remains true in the presence of noise traders:
Corollary 5.4. Suppose that all strategic agents have the same risk aversion γ¯ = γ1 = . . . = γN .
Then:
LiPrt =
2Λ
N
(µψt − δψ˙t).
To illustrate the intuition behind this result, consider the simplest case where the noise traders
simply sell at a constant rate, ψ˙ < 0. Put differently, the number of risky shares available for
trading expands linearly. Then LiPrt = −2ΛN δψ˙ > 0. This illustrates how market growth can lead
to positive liquidity premia even for homogenous agents.
If there is only one strategy agent (N = 1), we are always in the setting of Corollary 5.4. An
example is the model of Garleanu and Pedersen [18, Section 4] with a single risky asset (d = 1),
a single strategic agent without random endowment (ζ = 0) and exogenous noise traders, whose
positions ψt are mean-reverting around a stochastic mean:
8
dψt = κψ(Xt − ψt)dt,
where X is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process driven by a Brownian motion WX :
dXt = −κXXtdt+ σXdWXt .
In the notation from Section 5, we then have ψ˙t = κψ(Xt − ψt) and
µψt = −κψκXXt − κψψ˙t = −κψκXXt − κ2ψ(Xt − ψt) = κ2ψψt − κψ(κψ + κX)Xt.
8Several groups of noise traders with different mean positions as considered in [18, Section 4] can be treated
analogously.
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We therefore recover the nontrivial liquidity premia of [18, Proposition 9], to which we also refer
for a discussion of the corresponding comparative statics.
To obtain nontrivial liquidity premia in a model with only strategic agents and a fixed supply
of risky assets, one needs to consider agents with heterogeneous risk aversions. To ease notation
and interpretation, suppose there are no noise traders (ψ = 0). Then, the liquidity premium (5.5)
is simplifies to
LiPrt =
Σ
N
N∑
n=1
(γn − γ¯)(ϕΛ,nt − ϕ¯nt ).
This means that the liquidity premium is the sample covariance between the vector (γ1, . . . , γN )
of risk aversions and the current deviations (ϕΛ,1t − ϕ¯1t , . . . , ϕΛ,Nt − ϕ¯Nt ) between the agents’ actual
positions and their frictionless targets. Hence, the liquidity premium is positive if and only if
sensitivity and excess exposure to risk are positively correlated, i.e., if the more risk averse agents
hold larger risky positions than in the (efficient) frictionless equilibrium. Then, these agents will
tend to be net sellers and, as their trading motive is stronger than for the net buyers, a positive
liquidity premium is needed to clear the market.
To shed further light on the dynamics of liquidity premia induced by heterogenous risk aversions,
we now consider some concrete examples where the aggregate of the agents’ endowments is zero
as in [32]. First, we consider the simplest case where endowment exposures have independent,
stationary increments:
Corollary 5.5. Let the time horizon be infinite and consider two strategic agents with risk aversions
γ1 < γ2, discount rate δ > 0, and endowment volatilities following arithmetic Brownian motions:
ζ1t = at+Nt, ζ
2
t = −ζ1t ,
for an Rd-valued Brownian motion N and a ∈ Rd. Then, the frictionless equilibrium return van-
ishes. The equilibrium return with transaction costs has Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics:
dµΛt =
(√
γ1 + γ2
2
ΣΛ−1
2
+
δ2
4
Id − δ
2
Id
)(
2
γ1 − γ2
γ1 + γ2
δΛa − µΛt
)
dt+
(γ1 − γ2)Σ
2
dNt.
Proof. The frictionless equilibrium return vanishes by (3.1). In view of Theorem 5.2 and since
ζ2 = −ζ1, its frictional counterpart is given by
µΛt =
(γ1 − γ2)Σ
2
(ϕΛ,1t + ζ
1
t ). (5.6)
By Lemma 5.1 as well as Theorem A.2 (with B = γ1+γ22
Λ−1Σ
2 and ξt = −ζ1t ) and the representation
(A.17) from its proof, Agent 1’s optimal trading rate is
ϕ˙Λ,1t = ξ¯
1
t −
(√
∆− δ
2
Id
)
ϕΛ,1t , (5.7)
where
∆ =
γ1 + γ2
2
Λ−1Σ
2
+
δ2
4
Id,
ξ¯1t = −
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
E
[∫ ∞
t
(√
∆+ δ2Id
)
e−(
√
∆+ δ
2
Id)(u−t)(au+Nu)du
∣∣∣Ft
]
= −
(√
∆− δ
2
Id
)(
ζ1t + (
√
∆+ δ2Id)
−1a
)
.
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Here, we have used an elementary integration and the martingale property of N for the last equality.
Plugging this back into (5.7) yields
ϕ˙Λ,1t = −
(√
∆− δ
2
Id
)(
ϕΛ,1t + ζ
1
t + (
√
∆+ δ2Id)
−1a
)
.
Inserting this into (5.6) in turn leads to the asserted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics:
dµΛt =
(γ1−γ2)Σ
2 (ϕ˙
Λ,1
t dt+ dζ
1
t )
= (γ
1−γ2)Σ
2
((
−
(√
∆− δ2Id
)(
ϕΛ,1t + ζ
1
t + (
√
∆+ δ2Id)
−1a
)
+ a
)
dt+ dNt
)
=
(
(γ1−γ2)Σ
2
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
(∆− δ24 Id)−1δa) − Σ
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
Σ−1µΛt
)
dt+ (γ
1−γ2)Σ
2 dNt
=
(
2γ
1−γ2
γ1+γ2
Σ
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
Σ−1δΛa− Σ
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
Σ−1µΛt
)
dt+ (γ
1−γ2)Σ
2 dNt
= Σ
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
Σ−1
(
2γ
1−γ2
γ1+γ2
δΛa− µΛt
)
dt+ (γ
1−γ2)Σ
2 dNt
=
(√
γ1+γ2
2
ΣΛ−1
2 +
δ2
4 Id − δ2Id
)(
2γ1−γ2γ1+γ2 δΛa− µ
Λ
t
)
dt+ (γ1−γ2)Σ2 dNt,
where we have used Lemma B.2(b) in the last equality.
Let us briefly discuss the comparative statics of the above formula. In line with Corollary 5.3, the
average liquidity premium 2γ1−γ2γ1+γ2 δΛa and the corresponding volatility both vanish if the agents’ risk
aversions coincide. More generally, its size is proportional to the degree of heterogenity, measured
by γ1−γ2γ1+γ2 , multiplied by the discount rate δ, the trading cost Λ, and the trend a of Agent 1’s position.
To understand the intuition behind this result, suppose that a < 0 so that Agent 1 is a net buyer
and Agent 2 is a net seller. Since γ1 < γ2, Agent’s 2 motive to sell dominates Agent’s 1 motive to
buy and hence an additional positive drift is required to clear the market with friction. Since these
readjustments do not happen immediately but only gradually over time, the size of these effects
is multiplied by the discount rate δ: a higher demand for immediacy forces the more risk averse
agent to pay a larger premium.
Even for correlated assets, the average liquidity premium only depends on the trading cost
for the respective asset and the corresponding imbalance in Agent 1 and 2’s demands. The linear
scaling in the trading cost also shows that for small costs, the average value of the liquidity premium
is much smaller than its standard deviations (which then scale with the square-root of the liquidity
premium).
Finally, note that liquidity premia are mean reverting here even though the agents’ endowments
are not stationary. The reason is the sluggishness of the agents’ portfolios with transaction costs:
the stronger trading need of the more risk-averse agent is not realized immediately but only grad-
ually. This endogenously leads to autocorrelated returns like in the reduced-form models from the
frictionless portfolio choice literature [30, 46].
Next, we turn to a stationary model where endowment exposures are also mean-reverting as in
[12, 18]. This generates an additional state variable, that appears in the corresponding liquidity
premia as a stochastic mean-reversion level:
Corollary 5.6. Let the time horizon be infinite and consider two strategic agents with risk aversions
γ1 < γ2, discount rate δ > 0, and endowment volatilities with Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics:
dζ1t = −κζ1t dt+ dNt, dζ2t = −dζ1t , ζ10 = ζ20 = 0,
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for an Rd-valued Brownian motion N and a positive-definite mean-reversion matrix κ ∈ Rd×d.
Then, the frictionless equilibrium return vanishes. The equilibrium return with transaction costs
has Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type dynamics with a stochastic mean-reversion level that is a constant
multiple of the endowment levels:
dµΛt = Σ
(√
∆− δ
2
Id
)
Σ−1
(
(γ1 − γ2)Σ
2
(
κ(
√
∆+ δ2Id + κ)
−1 − (
√
∆− δ2Id)−1κ
)
ζ1t − µΛt
)
dt
+
(γ1 − γ2)Σ
2
dNt,
where
∆ =
γ1 + γ2
2
Λ−1Σ
2
+
δ2
4
Id.
Proof. As in Corollary 5.5, the frictionless equilibrium return vanishes by (3.1), its frictional coun-
terpart is given by (5.6), and Agent 1’s optimal trading rate is (5.7). The only change is the target
process ξ¯1, which can be computed as follows in the present context:
ξ¯1t = −
(√
∆− δ2Id
) ∫ ∞
t
(√
∆+ δ2Id
)
e−(
√
∆+ δ
2
Id)(u−t)E[ζ1u|Ft]du
= −
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
(
√
∆+ δ2Id)(
√
∆+ δ2Id + κ)
−1ζ1t .
Here, we have used the expectation E[ζ1u|Ft] = e−κ(u−t)ζ1t of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes and an
elementary integration for the last equality. Plugging this back into (5.7) yields
ϕ˙Λ,1t = −
(√
∆− δ2Id
)(
ϕΛ,1t + (
√
∆+ δ2Id)(
√
∆+ δ2Id + κ)
−1ζ1t
)
.
Inserting this (5.6) in turn leads to the asserted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics:
dµΛt =
(γ1−γ2)Σ
2 (ϕ˙
Λ,1
t dt+ dζ
1
t )
= (γ
1−γ2)Σ
2
((
−
(√
∆− δ2Id
)(
ϕΛ,1t + (
√
∆+ δ2Id)(
√
∆+ δ2Id + κ)
−1ζ1t
)
− κζ1t
)
dt+ dNt
)
= Σ
(√
∆− δ2Id
)
Σ−1
(
(γ1−γ2)Σ
2
(
κ(
√
∆+ δ2Id + κ)
−1 − (
√
∆− δ2Id)−1κ
)
ζ1t − µΛt
)
dt
+ (γ
1−γ2)Σ
2 dNt.
For a single risky asset (d = 1), the mean-reversion level of the liquidity premium in Corollary 5.6
can be rewritten as
(γ2 − γ1)Σκ(δ + κ)
2(
√
∆+ δ2Id + κ)(
√
∆− δ2Id)
ζ1t = 2
γ2 − γ1
γ1 + γ2
Λκ(κ+ δ)
(
1− κ√
∆+ δ2Id + κ
)
ζ1t .
Since γ1 < γ2, the coefficient of ζ
1
t in this expression is positive, so that the sign of the liquidity
premium depends on Agent 1’s risky exposure ζ1t . If ζ
1
t > 0, mean-reversion implies that Agent 1’s
exposure will tend to decrease, so that this agent will want to buy back part of her negative hedging
position in the risky asset. Conversely, Agent 2 will tend to sell risky shares. Since Agent 2 is more
risk averse, her selling motive dominates and needs to be offset by an additional positive expected
return to clear the market, in line with the sign of the above expression.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a tractable risk-sharing model that allows to study how trading costs are
reflected in expected returns. In a continuous-time model populated by heterogenous mean-variance
investors, we characterize the unique equilibrium by a system of coupled but linear FBSDEs. This
system can be solved in terms of matrix power series, and leads to fully explicit equilibrium dynamics
in a number of concrete settings.
If all agents are homogenous, positive liquidity premia are obtained if the asset supply expands
over time. For a fixed asset supply but heterogenous agents, the sign of the liquidity premia com-
pared to the frictionless case is determined by the trading needs of the more risk averse agents. Since
these have a stronger motive to trade, they need to compensate their more risk-tolerant counter-
parties accordingly. The sluggishness of illiquid portfolios also introduces autocorrelation into the
corresponding equilibrium expected returns even for fundamentals with independent increments.
Several extensions of the present model are intriguing directions for further research. One
important direction concerns more general specifications of preferences (e.g., exponential rather
than quadratic utilities) or trading costs (e.g., proportional instead of quadratic). Such variations
are bound to destroy the linearity of the corresponding optimality conditions, but might still lead
to tractable results in the small-cost limit similarly as for models with exogenous prices [42, 36, 27].
Another important direction for further research concerns extensions where the price volatility is no
longer assumed to be exogenously given, but is instead determined as an output of the equilibrium.
However, even the simplest versions of such models are also bound to lead to nonlinear FBSDEs.
A Existence and Uniqueness of Linear FBSDEs
For the determination of both individually optimal trading strategies in Section 4 and equilibrium
returns in Section 5, this appendix develops existence and uniqueness results for systems of coupled
but linear FBSDEs:9
dϕt = ϕ˙tdt, ϕ0 = 0, t ∈ T , (A.1)
dϕ˙t = dMt +B (ϕt − ξt) dt+ δϕ˙tdt, t ∈ T , (A.2)
where B ∈ Rℓ×ℓ has only positive eigenvalues, δ ≥ 0, and ξ ∈ L 2δ . If T <∞, (A.2) is complemented
by the terminal condition
ϕ˙T = 0. (A.3)
If T = ∞, we assume that δ > 0 and the terminal condition is replaced by the transversality
conditions implicit in ϕ, ϕ˙ ∈ L 2δ for δ > 0. A solution of (A.1–A.2) is a triple (ϕ, ϕ˙,M) for which
ϕ, ϕ˙ ∈ L 2δ and M is a martingale on T with finite second moments.
We first consider the infinite time-horizon case. In this case, the linear FBSDEs (A.1-A.2)
can be solved using matrix exponentials similarly as in [18]. To this end, we first establish a
technical result stating that the martingale M appearing in the solution of the FBSDE (A.1–A.2)
automatically belongs to M 2δ :
Proposition A.1. Let T =∞. If (ϕ, ϕ˙,M) is a solution to the FBSDE (A.1–A.2), then M ∈ M 2δ .
9Due to the degeneracy of the forward component (A.1), general FBSDE theory as in [15] only yields local
existence. However, the direct arguments developed below allow to establish global existence and also lead to explicit
representations of the solution in terms of matrix power series.
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Proof. Let (ϕ, ϕ˙,M) be a solution to the FBSDE (A.1–A.2), where ϕ, ϕ˙ ∈ L 2δ andM is a martingale
on [0,∞) with finite second moments. Fix t ∈ (0,∞). Then integration by parts yields
e−δtϕ˙t = ϕ˙0 +
∫ t
0
e−δsdMs +
∫ t
0
e−δsB(ϕs − ξs)ds. (A.4)
Let ‖ · ‖2 be the Euclidean norm in Rℓ and ‖ · ‖max the maximum norm on Rℓ×ℓ. Rearranging (A.4)
and using subsequently the elementary inequality (a+ b+ c)2 ≤ 3(a2 + b2 + c2) for a, b, c ∈ R, the
elementary estimate ‖Ax‖2 ≤
√
ℓ‖A‖max‖x‖2, and Jensen’s inequality gives∥∥∥∥
∫ t
0
e−δsdMs
∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ 3
(
‖ϕ˙0‖22 + e−2δt‖ϕ˙t‖22 +
(∫ t
0
e−δs
√
ℓ‖B‖max‖ϕs − ξs‖2ds
)2)
≤ 3
(
‖ϕ˙0‖22 + e−δt‖ϕ˙t‖22 +
ℓ
δ
‖B‖2max
∫ t
0
e−δs‖ϕs − ξs‖22ds
)
. (A.5)
The definitions of the maximum and Euclidean norms, the estimate |[N1, N2]| ≤ 12([N1] + [N2])
for real-valued local martingales N1 and N2, and Itoˆ’s isometry give, for t ∈ (0,∞),
E
[∥∥∥∫ t
0
e−2δsd[M ]s
∥∥∥
max
]
= E
[
max
i,j∈{1,...,ℓ}
∫ t
0
e−2δsd[M i,M j ]s
]
≤ 1
2
E
[
max
i∈{1,...,ℓ}
∫ t
0
e−2δsd[M i]s + max
j∈{1,...,ℓ}
∫ t
0
e−2δsd[M j ]s
]
= E
[
max
i∈{1,...,ℓ}
∫ t
0
e−2δsd[M i]s
]
≤ E
[
ℓ∑
i=1
∫ t
0
e−2δsd[M i]s
]
= E
[
ℓ∑
i=1
(∫ t
0
e−δsdM is
)2]
= E
[∥∥∥∥
∫ t
0
e−δsdMs
∥∥∥∥
2
2
]
. (A.6)
Since ϕ˙ ∈ L 2δ , there exists an increasing sequence (tk)k∈N with limk→∞ tk =∞ such that
lim
n→∞E
[
e−δtk‖ϕ˙tk‖22
]
= 0. (A.7)
Monotone convergence, (A.5-A.7) and ϕ, ξ ∈ L 2δ in turn yield
E
[∥∥∥ ∫ ∞
0
e−2δsd[M ]s
∥∥∥
max
]
= lim
k→∞
E
[∥∥∥ ∫ tk
0
e−2δsd[M ]s
∥∥∥
max
]
≤ lim
k→∞
E
[∥∥∥∥
∫ tk
0
e−δsdMs
∥∥∥∥
2
2
]
≤ 3ℓ
(
‖ϕ˙0‖22 +
ℓ
δ
‖B‖2maxE
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs‖ϕs − ξs‖22ds
])
<∞.
Thus, M ∈ M 2δ as claimed.
Theorem A.2. Suppose that T = ∞, δ > 0, and the matrix B from (A.2) has only positive
eigenvalues. Set ∆ = B + δ
2
4 Iℓ. Then, the unique solution of the FBSDE (A.1–A.2) is given by
ϕt =
∫ t
0
(
e−(
√
∆− δ
2
Iℓ)(t−s)ξ¯s
)
ds, (A.8)
where
ξ¯t =
(√
∆− δ2Iℓ
)
E
[∫ ∞
t
(√
∆+ δ2Iℓ
)
e−(
√
∆+ δ
2
Iℓ)(s−t)ξsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
. (A.9)
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Proof. Let (ϕ, ϕ˙,M) be a solution to the FBSDE (A.1–A.2) and define
ϕ˜t := e
− δ
2
tϕt.
Using that
˙˜ϕt = − δ2 ϕ˜t + e−
δ
2
tϕ˙t, d ˙˜ϕt = − δ2 ˙˜ϕtdt+ e−
δ
2
tdϕ˙t − δ2e−
δ
2
tϕ˙tdt (A.10)
and the FBSDE (A.1-A.2) for (ϕ, ϕ˙), it follows that (ϕ˜, ˙˜ϕ) solves the FBSDE
dϕ˜t = ˙˜ϕtdt, ϕ˜0 = 0, t ∈ T , (A.11)
d ˙˜ϕt = dM˜t +B
(
ϕ˜t − ξ˜t
)
dt+ δ
2
4 ϕ˜tdt, t ∈ T , (A.12)
where dM˜t = e
− δ
2
tdMt and ξ˜t = e
− δ
2
tξt. In matrix notation, this equation can be rewritten as
d(ϕ˜t, ˙˜ϕt)
⊤ = C1dM˜t + C2(ϕ˜t, ˙˜ϕt)⊤dt− C3ξ˜tdt,
with
C1 =
(
0
Iℓ
)
, C2 =
(
0 Iℓ
∆ 0
)
, C3 =
(
0
B
)
.
Integration by parts shows
d(e−C2t(ϕ˜t, ˙˜ϕt)⊤) = e−C2tC1dM˜t − e−C2tC3ξ˜tdt,
and in turn
e−C2u
(
ϕ˜u
˙˜ϕu
)
= e−C2t
(
ϕ˜t
˙˜ϕt
)
+
∫ u
t
e−C2sC1dM˜s −
∫ u
t
e−C2sC3ξ˜sds, for t < u <∞. (A.13)
Multiplying (A.13) by the matrix
C˜2 =
(
Iℓ
√
∆
−1
√
∆ Iℓ
)
and setting H(t) = C˜2e
−C2t yields
H(u)
(
ϕ˜u
˙˜ϕu
)
= H(t)
(
ϕ˜t
˙˜ϕt
)
+
∫ u
t
H(s)C1dM˜s −
∫ u
t
H˜(s)C3ξ˜sds, for t < u <∞. (A.14)
It follows by induction that
C˜2(−C2t)2n =

 ∆n ∆n−12
∆n+
1
2 ∆n

 t2n, C˜2(−C2t)2n+1 = −
(
∆n+
1
2 ∆n
∆n+1 ∆n+
1
2
)
t2n+1, n ≥ 0.
Now, the power series for the exponential function allows to deduce
H(t) =
(
e−
√
∆t
√
∆
−1
e−
√
∆t
√
∆e−
√
∆t e−
√
∆t
)
.
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Together with (A.14), it follows that
√
∆e−
√
∆uϕ˜u + e
−
√
∆u ˙˜ϕu =
√
∆e−
√
∆tϕ˜t + e
−
√
∆t ˙˜ϕt
+
∫ u
t
e−
√
∆sdM˜s −
∫ u
t
e−
√
∆sBξ˜sds, for t < u <∞. (A.15)
By the assumption that ϕ, ϕ˙ ∈ L 1δ ⊂ L 2δ , (A.10) and the fact that all eigenvalues of
√
∆ are greater
or equal than δ/2 (because B has only nonnegative eigenvalues), there exists an increasing sequence
(uk)k∈N with limk→∞ uk = +∞ along which the left-hand side of (A.15) converges a.s. to zero.
Moreover, since M ∈ M 2δ by Proposition A.1 and ξ˜ ∈ L 2δ , the martingale convergence theorem
and monotone convergence (together with Jensen’s inequality) – also using that all eigenvalues of√
∆ are greater or equal than δ/2 – imply that for u→∞ (and a fortiori along (uk)k∈N) the right
hand side of (A.15) converges a.s. to
√
∆e−
√
∆tϕ˜t + e
−
√
∆t ˙˜ϕt +
∫ ∞
t
e−
√
∆sdM˜s −
∫ ∞
t
e−
√
∆sBξ˜sds. (A.16)
Together, these two limits show that (A.16) vanishes. Multiplying (A.16) by e
√
∆t, rearranging, and
taking conditional expectations (using again that all eigenvalues of
√
∆ are larger than or equal to
δ/2) we obtain
˙˜ϕt = E
[∫ ∞
t
e−
√
∆(s−t)Be−
δ
2
sξsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
−
√
∆ϕ˜t.
Now, (A.10) and rearranging give
ϕ˙t = E
[∫ ∞
t
e−
√
∆(s−t)Be−
δ
2
(s−t)ξsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
−
(√
∆− δ2Iℓ
)
ϕt.
Finally, since B commutes with e−
√
∆(s−t) (as B = (
√
∆− δ2Iℓ)(
√
∆+ δ2Iℓ) and by Lemma B.2(a))
it follows that
ϕ˙t = ξ¯t −
(√
∆− δ2Iℓ
)
ϕt. (A.17)
By the variations of constants formula, this linear (random) ODE has the unique solution (A.8).
If a solution of the FBSDE (A.1-A.2) exists, it therefore must be of the form (A.8).
It remains to verify that (A.8) indeed solves the FBSDE (A.1-A.2). To this end, we first show
that ξ¯ ∈ L 2δ . Indeed, denote by ‖ · ‖2 both the Euclidean norm in Rℓ and the spectral norm in
Rℓ×ℓ. Since all eigenvalues of B are positive, there is ε > 0 such that all eigenvalues of
√
∆+ δ2Iℓ
are greater or equal that δ + ε. Hence, by Lemma B.2(c) and the definition of the spectral norm,
it follows that ∥∥∥∥e−(√∆+ δ2 Iℓ)t
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ e−(δ+ε)t, t ∈ [0,∞).
Thus, by the definition of ξ¯ in (A.9), the fact that B = (
√
∆− δ2Iℓ)(
√
∆+ δ2Iℓ), Jensen’s inequality
and Fubini’s theorem, we obtain
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt‖ξ¯t‖22dt
]
≤ ‖B‖
2
2
δ + ǫ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
∫ ∞
t
e−(δ+ε)(s−t)E
[‖ξs‖22] dsdt
≤ ‖B‖
2
2
δ + ε
∫ ∞
0
(∫ s
0
eεtdt
)
e−(δ+ε)sE
[‖ξs‖22] ds
≤ ‖B‖
2
2
ǫ(δ + ε)
∫ ∞
0
e−δsE
[‖ξs‖22] ds <∞.
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Next, we show that ϕ ∈ L 2δ . Arguing similarly as above, we have∥∥∥∥e−(√∆− δ2 Iℓ)t
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ e−εt, t ∈ [0,∞).
Thus, by the definition of ϕ in (A.8), Jensen’s inequality and Fubini’s theorem and since ξ¯ ∈ L 2δ
by the above arguments, we obtain
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt‖ϕt‖22dt
]
≤ 1
ε
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
∫ t
0
e−ǫ(t−s)E
[‖ξ¯s‖22] dsdt
≤ 1
ǫ
∫ ∞
0
(∫ ∞
s
e−(δ+ε)tdt
)
eεsE
[‖ξ¯s‖22] ds
=
1
ǫ(ǫδ + ǫ)
∫ ∞
0
e−δsE
[‖ξ¯s‖22] ds <∞.
By definition, we have ϕ0 = 0. Next, integration by parts shows that ϕ˙ satisfies the ODE (A.17),
and this yields ϕ˙ ∈ L 2δ (because ϕ, ξ¯ ∈ L 2δ ). Define the Rℓ-valued square-integrable martingale
(M¯t)t∈[0,∞) by10
M¯t = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−
√
∆sBξ˜sds
∣∣∣Ft
]
,
where ϕ˜t := e
− δ
2
tϕt and ξ˜t := e
− δ
2
tξt as before. Then multiplying (A.17) by the matrix e
−(
√
∆+ δ
2
Iℓ)t
and using (A.10) as well as ∆− δ24 Iℓ = B gives, after some rearrangement,
e−
√
∆t ˙˜ϕt = M¯t −
∫ t
0
e−
√
∆sBξ˜sds−
√
∆e−
√
∆tϕ˜t.
Taking differentials, we therefore obtain
−
√
∆e−
√
∆t ˙˜ϕtdt+ e
−√∆td ˙˜ϕt = dM¯t − e−
√
∆tBξ˜tdt−
√
∆e−
√
∆t ˙˜ϕtdt+∆e
−√∆tϕ˜tdt.
Rearranging, multiplying by e
√
∆t and using that
√
∆ and e
√
∆t commute, it follows that
d ˙˜ϕt = e
√
∆tdM¯t −Bξ˜tdt+∆ϕ˜tdt.
Finally, again taking into account (A.10) and defining the martingale M (which has finite second
moments) by
dMt = e
(
√
∆+ δ
2
Iℓ)tdM¯t, M0 = M¯0,
we obtain that ϕ from (A.8) indeed satisfies (A.1–A.2).
Let us briefly sketch the financial interpretation of the solution; cf. [18] for more details. In the
context of individually optimal trading strategies (cf. Lemma 4.1), the ODE (A.17) describes the
optimal trading rate. It prescribes to trade with a constant relative speed
√
∆ − δ2Iℓ towards the
target portfolio
(
√
∆− δ2Iℓ)−1ξ¯t = E
[∫ ∞
t
(√
∆+ δ2Iℓ
)
e−(
√
∆+ δ
2
Iℓ)(s−t)ξsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
.
10Note that
∫∞
0
e−
√
∆sBξ˜sds is square integrable because ξ ∈ L 2δ and all eigenvalues of
√
∆ are greater than δ/2.
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In the context of Lemma 4.1, this is an average of the future values of the frictionless optimal
trading strategy ξ, computed using an exponential discounting kernel. As the trading costs tend
to zero, the discount rate tends to infinity, and the target portfolio approaches the current value of
the frictionless optimizer, in line with the small-cost asymptotics of [36].
We now turn to the finite-horizon case. In order to satisfy the terminal condition ϕ˙T = 0, the
exponentials from Theorem A.2 need to be replaced by appropriate hyperbolic functions in the
one-dimensional case [5]. In the present multivariate context, this remains true if these hyperbolic
functions are used to define the corresponding “primary matrix functions” in the sense of Defini-
tion B.1. The first step to make this precise is the following auxiliary result, which is applied for
∆ = B + δ
2
4 Iℓ in Theorem A.4 below:
Lemma A.3. Let ∆ ∈ Rℓ×ℓ. The matrix-valued function
G(t) =
∞∑
n=0
1
(2n)!
∆n(T − t)2n (A.18)
is twice differentiable on R with derivative
G˙(t) = −
∞∑
n=0
1
(2n + 1)!
∆n+1(T − t)2n+1,
and solves the following ODE:
G¨(t) = ∆G(t), with G(T ) = Id and G˙(T ) = 0. (A.19)
Moreover, if the matrix ∆ has only positive eigenvalues then, in the sense of Definition B.1,
G(t) = cosh(
√
∆(T − t)), G˙(t) = −
√
∆sinh(
√
∆(T − t));
for δ ≥ 0, the matrix ∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t) is invertible for any t ∈ [0, T ] and, for any matrix norm ‖ · ‖,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∥∥∥∥(∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)−1∥∥∥∥ <∞. (A.20)
Proof. Note that
∑∞
n=0
1
(2n)!‖∆‖n(T − t)2n < ∞ for any matrix norm ‖ · ‖. Whence, G(t) is well
defined for each t ∈ R. By twice differentiating term by term, and estimating the resulting power
series in the same way, it is readily verified that G is twice continuously differentiable on R, has
the stated derivative, and is a solution of (A.19).
Suppose now that ∆ has only positive eigenvalues and δ ≥ 0. Then the first two additional
claims follow from Definition B.1 via the fact that B = (
√
B)2 and the series representation of the
smooth functions cosh and sinh. The final claim follows from Lemma B.2(c) and (d) since, for fixed
x ∈ (0,∞),
inf
t∈[0,T ]
x cosh(x(T − t)) + δ2x sinh(x(T − t)) ≥ x > 0.
The unique solution of our FBSDE can now be characterized using the function G(t) from
Lemma A.3 as follows:
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Theorem A.4. Suppose that T <∞ and that the matrix ∆ = B+ δ24 Iℓ has only positive eigenvalues.
Then, the unique solution of the FBSDE (A.1-A.2) with terminal condition (A.3) is given by
ϕt =
∫ t
0
(
e−
∫ t
s
F (u)duξ¯s
)
ds, (A.21)
where11
F (t) = −
(
∆G(t)− δ
2
G˙(t)
)−1
BG˙(t), (A.22)
ξ¯t =
(
∆G(t)− δ
2
G˙(t)
)−1
E
[∫ T
t
(
∆G(s)− δ
2
G˙(s)
)
Be−
δ
2
(s−t)ξsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
. (A.23)
Proof. Let (ϕ, ϕ˙) be a solution of the FBSDE (A.1–A.2) with terminal condition (A.3) and set
ϕ˜t := e
− δ
2
tϕt.
Using that
˙˜ϕt = − δ2 ϕ˜t + e−
δ
2
tϕ˙t, d ˙˜ϕt = − δ2 ˙˜ϕtdt+ e−
δ
2
tdϕ˙t − δ2e−
δ
2
tϕ˙tdt (A.24)
and the FBSDE (A.1–A.2) for (ϕ, ϕ˙) with (A.3), it follows that (ϕ˜, ˙˜ϕ) solves the FBSDE
dϕ˜t = ˙˜ϕtdt, ϕ˜0 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ] (A.25)
d ˙˜ϕt = dM˜t +B
(
ϕ˜t − ξ˜t
)
dt+ δ
2
4 ϕ˜tdt, t ∈ [0, T ], (A.26)
with terminal condition
˙˜ϕT = − δ2 ϕ˜T . (A.27)
Here dM˜t = e
− δ
2
tdMt is a square-integrable martingale (because M is) and ξ˜t = e
− δ
2
tξt. In matrix
notation, this equation can be rewritten as
d(ϕ˜t, ˙˜ϕt)
⊤ = C1dM˜t + C2(ϕ˜t, ˙˜ϕt)⊤dt− C3ξ˜tdt,
with
C1 =
(
0
Iℓ
)
, C2 =
(
0 Iℓ
∆ 0
)
, C3 =
(
0
B
)
.
Integration by parts shows
d(eC2(T−t)(ϕ˜t, ˙˜ϕt)⊤) = eC2(T−t)C1dM˜t − eC2(T−t)C3ξ˜tdt,
and in turn (
ϕ˜T
˙˜ϕT
)
= eC2(T−t)
(
ϕ˜t
˙˜ϕt
)
+
∫ T
t
eC2(T−s)C1dM˜s −
∫ T
t
eC2(T−s)C3ξ˜sds. (A.28)
Set H(t) = eC2(T−t) and note that
H(t) =
(
G(t) −∆−1G˙(t)
−G˙(t) G(t)
)
,
11Note that the inverses are well defined by Lemma A.3.
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for the function G(t) from Lemma A.3, as is readily verified by induction. Together with (A.28),
it follows that
ϕ˜T = G(t)ϕ˜t −∆−1G˙(t) ˙˜ϕt −
∫ T
t
∆−1G˙(s)dM˜s +
∫ T
t
∆−1G˙(s)Bξ˜sds,
˙˜ϕT = −G˙(t)ϕ˜t +G(t) ˙˜ϕt +
∫ T
t
G(s)dM˜s −
∫ T
t
G(s)Bξ˜sds.
Since ˙˜ϕT = − δ2 ϕ˜T by (A.27), this in turn yields
0 =
(
δ
2G(t)− G˙(t)
)
ϕ˜t +
(
− δ2∆−1G˙(t) +G(t)
)
˙˜ϕt +
∫ T
t
(
− δ2∆−1G˙(s) +G(s)
)
dM˜s
+
∫ T
t
(
δ
2∆
−1G˙(s)−G(s)
)
Bξ˜sds.
Multiplying this equation by ∆ and taking conditional expectations gives
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
˙˜ϕt = E
[∫ T
t
(
∆G(s)− δ2 G˙(s)
)
Bξ˜sds
∣∣∣Ft
]
+
(
∆G˙(t)− δ2∆G(t)
)
ϕ˜t.
Now, using (A.24) and rearranging, it follows that
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
e−
δ
2
tϕ˙t = E
[∫ T
t
(
∆G(s)− δ2 G˙(s)
)
Be−
δ
2
sξsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
+
(
∆− δ24 Iℓ
)
G˙(t)e−
δ
2
tϕt.
After multiplying with the inverse of
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
(which exists by Lemma A.3) and using
that ∆− δ24 Iℓ = B, this leads to
ϕ˙t = ξ¯t − F (t)ϕt. (A.29)
By the variations of constants formula, this linear (random) ODE has the unique solution (A.21).
If a solution of the FBSDE (A.1-A.2) exists, it therefore must be of the form (A.21).
It remains to verify that (A.21) indeed solves the FBSDE (A.1-A.2). First, note that ξ¯ ∈ L 2δ
by the fact that ξ ∈ L 2δ and the estimate (A.20), and in turn ϕ ∈ L 2δ . Moreover, by definition,
we have ϕ0 = 0. Next, integration by parts shows that ϕ˙ satisfies the ODE (A.29), and this yields
ϕ˙ ∈ L 2δ (because ϕ, ξ¯ ∈ L 2δ ) and ϕ˙T = 0 (because G(T ) = I and G˙(T ) = 0). Define the Rℓ-valued
square-integrable martingale (M¯t)t∈[0,T ] by
M¯t = E
[∫ T
0
(
∆G(s)− δ2G˙(s)
)
Bξ˜sds
∣∣∣Ft
]
,
where ϕ˜t := e
− δ
2
tϕt and ξ˜t := e
− δ
2
tξt as before. Then, multiplying (A.29) by
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
and
using (A.24) as well as ∆− δ24 Iℓ = B gives, after some rearrangement,
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
˙˜ϕt = M¯t −
∫ t
0
(
∆G(s)− δ2G˙(s)
)
Bξ˜sds+
(
∆G˙(t)− δ2∆G(t)
)
ϕ˜t.
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Taking differentials, we therefore obtain(
∆G˙(t)− δ2G¨(t)
)
˙˜ϕtdt+
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
d ˙˜ϕt
= dM¯t −
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
Bξ˜tdt+
(
∆G˙(t)− δ2∆G(t)
)
˙˜ϕtdt+
(
∆G¨(t)− δ2∆G˙(t)
)
ϕ˜tdt.
Using that G¨(t) = ∆G(t) by the ODE (A.19) and taking into account that ∆ commutes with both
G(t) and G˙(t) by Lemma B.2(a), it follows that(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
d ˙˜ϕt = dM¯t −
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
Bξ˜tdt+
(
∆G(t)− δ2G(t)
)
∆ϕ˜tdt.
Now, multiplying with the inverse of
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)
(which exists by Lemma A.3) and using
that ∆ = B + δ
2
4 Iℓ, we obtain
d ˙˜ϕt =
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)−1
dM¯t +B
(
ϕ˜t − ξ˜t
)
dt+ δ
2
4 ϕ˜tdt.
Finally, again taking into account (A.24) and defining the square-integrable martingale M by
dMt = e
δ
2
t
(
∆G(t)− δ2G˙(t)
)−1
dM¯t, M0 = M¯0,
we obtain that ϕ from (A.21) indeed satisfies the FBSDE dynamics (A.1-A.2) with terminal con-
dition (A.3).
Let us again briefly comment on the financial interpretation of this result in the context of
Lemma 4.1. The basic interpretation is the same as in the infinite-horizon case studied in Theo-
rem A.2. However, to account for the terminal condition that the trading speed needs to vanish,
the optimal relative trading speed in (A.29) is no longer constant. Instead, it interpolates between
this terminal condition and the stationary long-run value from Theorem A.2, that is approached
if the time horizon is distant. Analogously, the exponential discounting kernel used to compute
the target portfolio in Theorem A.2 is replaced by a more complex version here; compare [5] for a
detailed discussion in the one-dimensional case.
To apply Theorems A.2 and A.4 to characterize the equilibrium in Theorem 5.2 it remains to
verify that the matrix B appearing there only has real, positive eigenvalues, since this implies that
the matrix ∆ := B + δ
2
4 Iℓ has only real eigenvalues greater than δ
2/4 ≥ 0.
Lemma A.5. Let Λ ∈ Rd×d be a diagonal matrix with positive entries λ1, . . . , λd > 0, Σ ∈ Rd×d
a symmetric, positive definite matrix and γ1, . . . , γN > 0 with γN = max(γ1, . . . , γN ). Then, the
matrix
B =


γN−γ1
N
Λ−1Σ
2 · · · γ
N−γN−1
N
Λ−1Σ
2
... · · · ...
γN−γ1
N
Λ−1Σ
2 · · · γ
N−γN−1
N
Λ−1Σ
2

+


γ1 Λ
−1Σ
2 0
. . .
0 γN−1 Λ
−1Σ
2

 ∈ Rd(N−1)×d(N−1)
has only real, positive eigenvalues.
Proof. First, recall that two matrices that are similar have the same eigenvalues. Since the matrix
Λ−1Σ
2 has only positive eigenvalues (because it is the product of two symmetric positive definite
matrices, cf. [40, Proposition 6.1]), there is an invertible matrix P ∈ Rd×d and a diagonal matrix
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U ∈ Rd×d with positive diagonal entries u1, . . . , ud such that Λ−1Σ2 = PUP−1. Now, define the
matrix
Q =


P 0
. . .
0 P

 ∈ Rd(N−1)×d(N−1).
A direct computation shows that Q is invertible with inverse
Q−1 =


P−1 0
. . .
0 P−1

 ∈ Rd(N−1)×d(N−1).
Whence B is similar to B¯ := P−1BP , and
B¯ =


γN−γ1
N U · · · γ
N−γN−1
N U
... · · · ...
γN−γ1
N U · · · γ
N−γN−1
N U

+


γ1U 0
. . .
0 γN−1U

 .
To prove that B¯ (and hence B) only has real and positive eigenvalues, we calculate the deter-
minant of V (x) = xId(N−1) − B¯ for x ∈ C \ (0,∞) and show that det(V (x)) 6= 0. So let
x ∈ C \ (0,∞). Denote by Rd the commutative subring of all diagonal matrices in Cd×d and
let ℵ1, . . . ,ℵN−1, ג1(x), . . . גN−1(x) ∈ Rd be given by
ℵn = −γ
N − γn
N
U and גn(x) = xId − γnU.
With this notation, the Rd(N−1)×d(N−1)-valued matrix V (x) can also be understood as an element
of R(N−1)×(N−1)d (the (N−1)×(N−1) matrices with elements from the diagonal matrices in Rd×d)
and we have
V (x) =


ℵ1 + ג1(x) ℵ2 · · · ℵn−2 ℵN−1
ℵ1 ℵ2 + ג2(x) . . . ... ...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . . ℵN−2 + גN−2(x) ℵN−1
ℵ1 ℵ2 · · · ℵN−2 ℵN−1 + גN−1(x)


.
Now use that by [41, Theorem 1], det(V (x)) = det(det(V (x))), where det : R(N−1)×(N−1)d → Rd is
the determinant map on the commutative ring Rd. By subtracting the last row (in Rd) of V (x)
from the other rows, the problem boils down to calculating the determinant of
V¯ (x) :=


ג1(x) 0 · · · 0 −גN−1(x)
0 ג2(x)
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
...
0 · · · 0 גN−2(x) −גN−1(x)
ℵ1 ℵ2 · · · ℵN−2 ℵN−1 + גN−1(x)


.
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As x ∈ C\(0,∞) and for n ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}, the eigenvalues of γnU are γnu1, . . . , γnud ∈ (0,∞), it
follows that det(גn(x)) 6= 0 and hence גn(x) is invertible for each n. Now, subtracting ℵn(גn(x))−1-
times the n-th row from the last row for n = 1, . . . , N − 2, the problem simplifies to calculating the
determinant of
Vˆ (x) :=


ג1(x) 0 0 −גN−1(x)
0
. . . 0
...
0
. . . גN−2(x) −גN−1(x)
0 · · · 0 גN−1(x)
(
Id +
∑N−1
n=1 ℵn(גn(x))−1
)

 .
As a result:
det(Vˆ (x)) =
(
N−1∏
n=1
ג
n(x)
)(
Id +
N−1∑
n=1
ℵn(גn(x))−1
)
,
and in turn
det(V (x)) = det
(
det(Vˆ (x))
)
=
(
N−1∏
n=1
det(גn(x))
)
det
(
Id +
N−1∑
n=1
ℵn(גn(x))−1
)
.
It therefore remains to show that det
(
Id +
∑N−1
n=1 ℵn(גn(x))−1
)
6= 0. As Id +
∑N−1
n=1 ℵn(גn(x))−1
is a diagonal matrix, we have
det
(
Id +
N−1∑
n=1
ℵn(גn(x))−1
)
=
d∏
i=1
(
1 +
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
1
x− γnui
)
,
where αn = −γN−γnN , n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. As γN = max(γ1, . . . , γN ), we have αn ≤ 0 for each
n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. It suffices to show that for i ∈ {1, . . . , d},
1 +
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
1
x− γnui 6= 0. (A.30)
Writing x = ℜ(x)+ iℑ(x) and expanding each fraction in (A.30) by ℜ(x)−ℑ(x)i− γnui, we obtain
1 +
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
1
x− γnui = 1 +
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
ℜ(x)− γnui −ℑ(x)i
(ℜ(x)− γnui)2 + ℑ(x)2
= 1 + ℜ(x)
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
1
(ℜ(x)− γnui)2 + ℑ(x)2 (A.31)
+
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
−γnui
(ℜ(x)− γnui)2 + ℑ(x)2
−ℑ(x)i
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
1
(ℜ(x)− γnui)2 +ℑ(x)2
= 1 + ℜ(x)ci(x) + di(x)−ℑ(x)ici(x)
= 1 + di(x) + ci(x)x, (A.32)
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where x is the complex conjugate of x and
ci(x) =
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
1
(ℜ(x)− γnui)2 + ℑ(x)2 ,
di(x) =
N−1∑
n=1
αnui
−γnui
(ℜ(x)− γnui)2 + ℑ(x)2 .
As each αn is nonpositive, di(x) is nonnegative and ci(x) is nonpositive. Combining this with
x ∈ C \ (0,∞), it follows that 1 + di(x) + ci(x)x 6= 0 so that all eigenvalues of the matrix B are
indeed real and positive.
B Primary Matrix Functions
In this appendix, we collect some facts about matrix functions from the textbook [25] that are used
in Appendix A. First, we recall the definition of a (primary) matrix function:
Definition B.1. Let A ∈ Cℓ×ℓ be a matrix with distinct eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λm, m ≤ ℓ. Denote by
ni the algebraic multiplicity of λi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Let O be an open neighbourhood of λ1, . . . , λm
in C and f : O → C a function.12
(a) The function f is said to be defined on the spectrum of A if it is ni− 1-times differentiable at
λi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(b) If f is defined on the spectrum of A, then the primary matrix function f(A) is defined by
f(A) := p(A),
where p : C→ C is the unique Hermite interpolating polynomial satisfying p(k)(λi) = f (k)(λi)
for k ∈ {0, . . . , ni − 1} and i ∈ {1, . . . , s}.13
As a prime example, note that the exponential function is defined on the spectrum of all matrices
A ∈ Cℓ×ℓ and exp(A) is just the matrix exponential. We recall some elementary properties of
(primary) matrix functions:
Lemma B.2. Let A ∈ Cℓ×ℓ be a matrix with distinct eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λm, m ≤ ℓ and f : C→ C
a function defined on the spectrum of A. Then:
(a) If P ∈ Cℓ×ℓ commutes with A, then f(A) and P also commute.
(b) If P ∈ Cℓ×ℓ is invertible, then Pf(A)P−1 = f(PAP−1).
(c) The eigenvalues of f(A) are f(λ1), . . . , f(λm).
(d) f(A) is invertible if and only if f(λi) 6= 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. Assertions (a), (b) and (c) are parts of [25, Theorem 1.13]. Finally, (d) follows from (c) and
the fact that f(A) is invertible if and only if zero is not an eigenvalue.
12If A ∈ Rℓ×ℓ and all eigenvalues of A are real, O can be taken as an open neighbourhood of λ1, . . . , λm in R,
provided that f is also real valued.
13If A, λ1, . . . , λm, O and f are all real valued and f defined on the spectrum of A, the Hermite interpolating
polynomial is also real valued.
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Finally, we recall a result on the principal square root [25, Theorem 1.29]:
Lemma B.3. Let A ∈ Rℓ×ℓ be a matrix whose eigenvalues are all real and positive. Then there
exists a unique matrix P ∈ Rℓ×ℓ with positive eigenvalues such that P 2 = A. It is given by the
primary matrix function P =
√
A in the sense of Definition B.1.
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